THE ROLE OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE IN
MUNICIPALITIES' RELATIONS WITH CREDITORS
When a state legislature goes to the aid of a financially troubled
city, it must consider whether its rescue attempts will be thwarted by
the contract clause of the Constitution.' Once, perhaps, a strict inter-

pretation of the contract clause forbidding "any law which releases a
part of [a contractual] obligation"2 would have forced state legislatures
to stand idle while municipal creditors demanded total fulfillment of
their rights and remedies against the city.3 Now, however, the case

law interpreting the contract clause suggests a number of approaches
by which a state legislature may respond to creditors' demands with less

than absolute compliance.'
In viewing a municipality's relations with its creditors, three situations in which state legislation arguably impairs contracts will be ex-

amined: (1) alteration of contractual obligations and remedies when
no financial emergency exists; (2) legislative maneuvering in a financial emergency; (3) state "bankruptcy" legislation, and conservation of
municipal resources in the post-bankruptcy period. Before examining
what barriers the contract clause may still pose in these contexts, however, it is necessary to understand how it is that the contract clause regulates a city's relations with its creditors.
I.

APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

The term "contract" as used in article I, section 10 should be con1. "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts
....
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
2. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819).
3. The Marshall Court expanded the contract clause in a series of cases to give it a
literal application to contracts in existence at the time the state legislature seeks to alter
its obligations. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 104 (13th
ed. 1973); Funston, Requiescat in Pace: A Memorial to the Contract Clause, 31 FED.
BAR J. 350, 351-52 (1972); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 1),
57 HARv. L. REv. 512, 530-31 (1944).
See generally B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 27-53 (1938). The interpretation of the Marshall period
was solidified and applied in defense of private property interests during the tenure of
Chief Justice Taney from the mid-1830s to the mid-1860s. Id. at 63.
4. "Generally speaking, the protection afforded by [the contract] clause does not
today go much, if at all, beyond that afforded by Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment." E. CORWIN, supra note 3, at 104; see Funston, supra note 3, at 359; Note, The
Continuing Vitality of the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution, 40 So. CAL. L.
REv. 576, 589 (1967).
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sidered in its "usual or popular sense as signifying an agreement of two
or more minds, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do certain
acts." 5 The first case requiring an interpretation of the contract clause
by the Supreme Court established that contracts between the state and

private individuals, embodying, as they must, a promise by the legislature or by officials to whom the power to contract for the state has

been delegated, are within the purview of the contract clause and may
not be "impaired" by subsequent legislation. 6

It is also well estab-

lished that contracts between individuals and municipal corporations re7
ceive contract clause protection.
Judicial decisions have superimposed a requirement that the stat-

utes in force at the time of the making of a contract be deemed incorporated, as though by reference, into that contract for purposes of
application of the contract clause." Thus, laws which affect the validity, construction, discharge or enforcement of an existing contract are

all subject to circumscription by subsequent legislation modifying the
obligation.9
5. Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 146 (1922). Impairment of non-contractual
obligations is not covered by article I, section 10. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v.
Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883) (tort judgment against city for mob
violence not a contractual obligation and not protected); Garrison v. City of New York,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 196, 203 (1875) (judgment for compensation in eminent domain
proceeding not protected by contract clause). See also Hale, The Supreme Court and
the Contract Clause (pt. 2), 57 HARV. L. REv. 621, 622-23 (1944).
A judgment or garnishment may be protected by the contract clause, however, if the
procedure for obtaining judgment is altered, since the means of enforcement of the
contract-a substantial right-may thereby be impaired. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas,
292 U.S. 426, 432 (1934). See notes 8-9 infra and accompanying text.
6. Is the [contract] clause to be considered as inhibiting the state from impairing the obligation of contracts between two individuals, but as excluding from
that inhibition contracts made with itself?
The words themselves contain no such distinction. They are general, and
are applicable to contracts of every description. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 87, 137 (1810).
One commentator, however, has expressed the opinion that "[als an original
proposition, it seems quite arguable that the contract clause was not intended to do away
with a state's power to repudiate its own promises." Merrill, Application of the
Obligation of Contract Clause to State Promises, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 639 (1932).
7. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502
(1942); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1880); Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S.
472 (1880); Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879).
8. "To know the obligation of a contract we look to the laws in force at its
making." W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935); accord, Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1934); Von Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866). See also Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). But cf. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 343
(1827) (Marshall, C. J., dissenting): "We have, then, no hesitation in saying that,
however law may act upon contracts, it does not enter into them, and become a part of
the agreement."
9. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866); see
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The standards for evaluating state alteration of municipalities' con-

tracts with creditors are necessarily influenced by the stringency of the
judicial review of such legislative action. The general view is that
when a state, or a city acting as a representative of the state, becomes

a party to a contract "the same rules of law are applied to her as to
private persons under like circumstances."'"
At one point in the history of the contract clause the Supreme Court seemed to distinguish

between situations in which municipal corporations were performing inherently governmental functions (i.e., actions traditionally associated
with sovereignty) and those in which they were acting in a proprietary
capacity. Under this view, contracts involving proprietary acts would
be enforced as though they were between private individuals," while
contracts related to government administration would receive less protection from state alteration. Subsequently, however, the Court recognized that the constitutional proscription against impairment of con12
tracts should not affect a state's legitimate exercise of its police power,

and the governmental function/proprietary activity distinction lost its
importance.

The Court began to categorize all contracts which were

created for public purposes and which related to subjects affecting public safety and welfare as contracts "within the supervising power and
control of the legislature," so that when such contracts were statutorily

altered the contract clause "[could not] in every case be successfully
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 600 (1878).
10. Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 232 (1873); see Wood v. Lovett, 313
U.S. 362, 369 (1941) (obligation of state arising out of its deed of grant is as much
protected by the contract clause as an agreement of an individual); cf. Treigle v. Acme
Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936) (legislature has no greater right to interfere
with private contracts of quasi-public corporations than it would have to attempt a similar
interference in the case of a private corporation). But see Comment, The Constitutionality of the New York Municipal Wage Freeze and Debt Moratorium: Resurrection of
the Contract Clause, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 167, 187-88 (1976) (state's contracts subject
to stricter review than are those of private parties). This commentator's position is
supported largely by the empirical observation that "[tihe Supreme Court has often
invoked the contract clause to prevent states from repudiating their financial obligations." Id. at 199; see id. at 199-210.
11. Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 304-05 (1886); Broughton v. Pensacola, 93
U.S. 266, 269 (1876); see Merrill, supra note 6, at 647-50. According to this
distinction, when states and cities borrowed money and contracted to repay it with
interest, they were to be treated as acting in a proprietary capacity so that "their
contracts have the same meaning as that of similar contracts between private persons."
Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1878).
12. See notes 99-148 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of standards used
to determine the latitude a state has in exercising its police power in a way that alters
contract rights.
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Thus, the legitimacy of the relationship between the

state's police power and the subject matter and purpose of a contract

has become determinative of tie degree of state intervention which the
courts will allow. 1 4 Insofar as the health, safety and welfare of the

people are more likely to be involved in purely governmental functions
than in state or municipal proprietary functions, states are likely to be
allowed greater leeway in regulating contracts relating to a municipality's governmental affairs.15
II.
A.

NORMAL MUNICIPAL CREDITOR RELATIONS

Nature of an UnconstitutionalImpairment

There may be any number of reasons-some, perhaps, unrelated
to economic considerations-why a state decides to alter the rights or
remedies of a municipal creditor. Two very recent cases illustrate the
ways in which a state legislature may suddenly alter the status of a creditor who thinks that his rights are settled and enforceable.
The New York state legislature had empowered the Jones Beach
State Parkway Authority to operate and collect revenues from the
parkway 6 for the benefit of the Authority's bondholders. In addition,
the state had expressly covenanted that it would not "limit or alter"

those rights vested in the Authority.' 7 Thereafter, the Authority raised
the toll on one stretch of the parkway from ten to twenty-five cents.' 8
13. Chicago B.&Q.R.R. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57, 72 (1898), quoted with
approval h Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 514-15 n.2
(1942); cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695 (1896).
14. If contracts in furtherance of proprietary functions of a municipality affect the
public health, safety and welfare, they are subject to the proper exercise of the state's
police power regardless of the contract clause. See Chicago B.&Q.R.R. v. Nebraska,
170 U.S. 57, 72 (1898): "The presumption is that when. . . contracts are entered into
it is with the knowledge that parties cannot, by making agreements on subjects involving
the rights of the public, withdraw such subjects from the police power of the legislature."
See also Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942)
(composition or adjustment of claims of creditors of an insolvent municipality is within
police power of state, and specific plan in question did not contravene contract clause).
Likewise, contracts between private individuals may be subject to impairment by
exercise of the state's police power. See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
310 U.S. 32 (1940) (in exercise of police power, state could restrict withdrawal rights of
building and loan association certificate holders).
See notes 114-22 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship
required between legislation which causes an "impairment" and state police power goals.
15. Similarly, a contract relating to the proprietary affairs of government is more
amenable to state regulation than is a contract between private individuals.
16. N.Y. Pun. AuTH. LAw § 153-b(5) (McKinney 1962).
17. Id. § 158-a(l).
18. Patterson v. Carey, 52 App. Div. 2d 171, 174, 383 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1976).
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In response, the state legislature enacted legislation rolling back the toll
to ten cents and establishing procedures which the Authority was required to follow prior to any future toll increases.' 9 In Patterson v.
Carey,20 the Authority's bondholders challenged both the toll rollback
and the newly imposed procedures as impairing their contractual obligations. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held
that the new procedural requirements did not work any impairment of
the bondholders' rights,"' but the court condemned the toll rollback as
an impairment which could not be justified as an exercise of state police
power.22
In the second case, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,23 bondholders of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey challenged
repeal of a previous legislative covenant between themselves and the
states of New York and New Jersey.24 The covenant had been part
of an act which authorized the Port Authority to construct the World
Trade Center and to acquire the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad 25 and
which, by its terms, precluded New York, New Jersey and the Port Authority from spending the Authority's revenues and reserves for the
purpose of subsidizing passenger railroads unless certain economic criteria were met.26 A New Jersey lower court held that repeal of the
covenant was a proper exercise of state police power; accordingly, any
resulting impairment was not constitutionally impermissible. 2' The
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed in a per curiam opinion.28
In cases such as these it must first be determined whether there
has been an actual impairment of the obligations of the contracts in
issue, and second, if so, whether it is of a character which is constitutionally proscribed. Essential to the question of whether a law has the
effect of "impairing the Obligation of Contracts" are the definitions of
the terms "obligation" and "impairing." The obligations protected by
the contract clause have already been outlined.20 Not all obligations,
19. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAw, § 153-c (McKinney 1962).
20. 52 App. Div. 2d 171, 383 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1976).
21. Id. at 178, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
22. Id. at 177, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
23.

134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353

A.2d 514, prob. juris. noted, 96 S. Ct. 3188 (1976).
24. 1974 N.J. Laws ch. 25 (repealing act).
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-35.50 (West 1963).
26. Id. § 32:1-35.55.

27. 134 N.J. Super. 124, 383 A.2d 833 (1975).
28. 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976).
29. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text. In summary, protected obligations
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however, have been accorded the same degree of protection by the Supreme Court. Differing results in cases dealing with similar obligations
can be explained in terms of the Court's theory of what constitutes an
impairment for contract clause purposes.
At first, the Court appeared to consider any impairment of a contract by state legislation to be a violation of the contract clause, and

to find such an impairment whenever the value of the contract
was diminished.3 0

Nevertheless, it was recognized that states could

alter the form of the contractual remedy if "no substantial right secured
by the contract [was] thereby impaired."'" In order to determine
whether a substantial right was involved, changes of remedy were subjected to the same scrutiny as alterations of rights.32 As will be seen,
these positions have been modified in subsequent cases: the right-reinclude the rights and remedies incorporated into the terms of the contract or legislative
covenant as well as the laws existing at the time the contract is made.
30. One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is, that its value has by
legislation been diminished. It is not, by the Constitution, to be impaired
at all. This is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation, dispensing with any part of its force.
Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 327 (1848).
Accord, Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
31. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 553 (1866); see Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 430-31, 434 n.13 (1934); Bronson v.
Kinzie, 42 U.S. (IHow.) 311, 316 (1843). The Court has consistently recognized that
statutory changes of a remedy for enforcement of contract rights will be constitutional
even if applied retroactively so long as the contract is not thereby "impaired": "Without
impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the
wisdom of the nation shall direct." Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122,
200 (1819). Of course, such a statement merely assumes the conclusion until a standard
is developed for determining what sorts of modifications of remedies constitute impairments. This problem is discussed at notes 36-72 infra and accompanying text. For
illustrations of statutory modifications of remedies which were upheld or assumed to be
proper during the early history of the contract clause, see Penniman's Case, 103 U.S.
714 (1880) (statute abolishing imprisonment for debt upheld as applied to a debt
judgment rendered before statute was passed); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311,
315-16 (1843) (dicta assuming that retroactive application of alterations in statutes of
limitations or exemption laws would not conflict with the contract clause).
32. The question of whether a legislative act which purports to alter only contractual
remedies will be treated with more deference than one which touches rights is an issue
which has been considered from the earliest days of contract clause construction. In
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), the Court expressed the view that if the
remedy was changed so as "materially to impair" contract rights, the result would be "as
much a violation of the compact as if [the law] overturned [the obligee's] rights and
interests." Id. at 17. But this language merely measures the extent of a change of
remedy in terms of whether it impairs a right. It does not settle whether any alteration
of rights could be tolerated on a theory that contractual value is not affected or on some
other theory that would avoid characterizing the alteration as an impairment. See also
Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 315-18 (1843).
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medy distinction has been implicitly abolished, 33 the police power rationale protects some legislative impairments from constitutional sanction,34 and, while the value of the contract is still measured in terms

of its worth in dollars and cents at the time of performance, it has been
held that an obligee is not entitled to obtain greater value as a result

than he could have obtained from the obligor's perforof a default
35
mance.
For the most part, the Court has taken a practical approach to the

concrete facts presented by each case in deciding whether there has
been an impairment.3 6 Examination of such cases yields several generalizations concerning the standards to be used in determining
whether the value of an affected contract has been reduced. In Von
Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 7 the Court reviewed a state statute which

limited to fifty cents on each hundred dollars' worth of property the
amount of tax which Quincy could levy to meet its debts and expenses.38

The statute was challenged by a holder of Quincy's municipal bonds
which had been issued at a time when state legislation authorized the

levying of a special tax sufficient to pay the bond coupons as they came
due."

The Court stated that if a deficiency in bond coupon payments

would occur because of the taxing limitations imposed by the new law,
the bondholders' contract rights would be deemed impaired; if no tax
revenues would be available for coupon payments after city expenses
were paid, the bond contract could be regarded as "annulled."4 The
Court went on to find that the amount which the city could collect under the new tax law, after first providing for payment of current city
33. See Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866),
quoted with approval in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 430
(1934): "[Nlothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of enforcement." The Court viewed the distinction as "one rather of form than substance." Id. at
554.
The more recent cases have tended toward a view similar to that taken in Von
Hoffman, refusing to base factual analyses or legal conclusions on distinctions between
right and remedy: "[D]ecisions dating from Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell .. .
have not placed critical reliance on the distinction between obligation and remedy." City
of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506 n.9 (1965). See, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60, 62 (1935); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 430-34 (1934). See generally Hale, supra note 3, at 533-57, especially 556-57.
34. See notes 99-148 inf!ra and accompanying text.
35. See notes 67-72 infra and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 549.
39. Id. at 548-49.
40. "To the extent of the deficiency the obligation of the contract will be impaired,
and if there be nothing applicable, it may be regarded as annulled." Id. at 554.
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expenses, would not be sufficient to pay the bond debt. 4

On this

basis, the Court nullified the law as an unconstitutional impairment and
issued a writ of mandamus to compel the imposition and collection of
the taxes authorized when the bonds were originally issued.42 Thus
the Court looked to the legislation's practical effect of preventing the
city from fulfilling its obligation to bondholders in determining that the
statute worked an impairment.
A case decided fourteen years after Von Hoffman illustrates even
more clearly that the Court considers impairment to be a function of
the practical effect of a challenged statute rather than of an abstract
consideration of its provisions. In Louisiana v. New Orleans43 it was
held that an impairment would result if legislation tended "to postpone
or retard the enforcement of the contract. . . .' The Court refused
to find an impairment in that case even though the challenged statute

on its face seemed to do just that.4 5 Although the state legislation
limited the fund from which creditors of the city of New Orleans could
satisfy their claims, the facts of record in the case did not show that
there was not enough in the city treasury to pay the complainant's
claims.40 The Court determined on the basis of this finding that the
practical effect of the legislation at the time when the creditor sought
41. Id.
42. Id. at 555. Though the Court "cannot make laws when the state refused to pass
them," it can and does nullify state legislation which contravenes the contract clause and
compel state officers to levy and collect taxes and to apply the proceeds as authorized
under state law. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 520-21 (1880) (Field, J.,
concurring). See notes 228-40 inlra and accompanying text relating to states' powers to
revoke or alter municipal charters.
43. 102 U.S. 203 (1880).
44. Id. at 207. The Court was explicit about the type of state legislation which
would impair a contract:
Whatever legislation lessens the efficacy of [the means provided by law by
which a contract can be enforced] impairs the obligation. If it tend to postpone or retard the enforcement of the contract, the obligation of the latter
is to that extent weakened. Id. at 206-07.
45. At issue was the validity of an act divesting state courts of authority to issue
mandamus orders directing officers of the city of New Orleans to enforce city creditors'
claims. The statute also included a new requirement that city creditors file and register
their judgments, at which time a warrant would be issued for the amount due. Payment
was to come not from a specific appropriation but rather from an amount designated in
the city budget for payment of such judgments. The act further provided that when the
designated fund was exhausted, the common council could appropriate payment from the
amount set aside for contingent expenses; if the council did not do so, the judgment
would be paid in the order of its registration from the next year's budget appropriation.
Id. at 205-06.
46. Id. at 207. In addition, the Court declined to find that the creditor would be
delayed in enforcing his claims by the added requirement of placing a copy of his
judgment on file with the city controller. Id. See note 45 supra.
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to collect his debt from the city had not been shown to disadvantage
the creditor: his expectations of enforcement under the present statute
were no less than under the legislation in effect when the creditor-

debtor relationship was formed. 47 Accordingly, no impairment resulted from the challenged legislation.
The 1934 case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell"
has been described as a watershed in the history of the interpretation
of the contract clause.4" However, while Blaisdell gave new emphasis

to the state's police power as a factor in the analysis,50 an examination
of the post-1934 cases suggests that the decision had little effect on the
evolving definition of impairment. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of
Asbury Park1 clearly indicates that the Court continued to employ
the same practical approach toward what constitutes an impairment as
had been developed in the earlier cases. 52 Though a concern for the
47. 102 U.S. at 207.
48. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
49. "The Blaisdell opinion . . . amounted to a comprehensive restatement of the
principles underlying the application of the Contract Clause . . . ." City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965); see B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 109.
Justice Sutherland, writing in a vehement but scholarly dissent to Blaisdell, summarized his view of its import as follows:
Few questions of greater moment than that just decided have been submitted
for judicial inquiry during this generation. He simply closes his eyes to the
necessary implications of the decision who fails to see in it the potentiality
of future gradual but ever-advancing encroachments upon the sanctity of private and public contracts. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 448 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
One way in which Blaisdell affects subsequent judicial interpretation is by diminishing the importance in contract clause analysis of any historical review of the reasons
which led to adoption of the contract clause. In accord with previous historical studies,
the Court acknowledged that the contract clause undoubtedly was meant to deal with the
type of state legislation which had led to a critical undermining of credit in the postrevolutionary period, when the states protected debtors by defeating creditors' contractual
rights. Id. at 427 (majority opinion). However, it found in the line of decisions
interpreting the contract clause "a growing appreciation of public needs and of the
necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and
public welfare." Id. at 442. The Court, therefore, denied that "what the provision of
the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time,"
id., though the Moratorium Act which the Court upheld was essentially legislation
protecting debtors at the expense of creditors' literal contract rights-the same type of
legislation as that which troubled the framers of the Constitution.
For an historical inquiry into the original purposes of the contract clause, see, e.g.,
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819); B. WRIGHT, supra note 3,
at 4-16.
50. While prior cases were concerned primarily with "remedial changes," Blaisdell
employed the police power rationale to sustain "a Minnesota statute which seemed, by
the Court's own standards, to do more than alter the remedy." B. WRIGHT, supra note 3,
at 109. The case is discussed at notes 123-27 infra and accompanying text.
51. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
52. See also W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935):
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state's police power is implicit in the Faitoute opinion,5 3 the Court
apparently concluded as a factual matter that no impairment resulted

from the challenged state legislation.5
The facts of Faitoute are crucial to an understanding of the Court's
standard for determining when an impairment exists. At issue in the

case was a New Jersey statute authorizing state control over insolvent
municipalities. 51 Pursuant to this statute the finances of Asbury Park
were placed under control of a state commission at the instance of some
of the city's creditors.50 Thereafter a plan providing for a refund of
the outstanding unsecured bonds and an exchange of that indebtedness

for new bonds with extended maturity and a lower interest rate was
approved by the commission and consented to by bondholders5 repre7
senting eighty-five percent of the amount of indebtedness affected.
In Faitoute the Supreme Court held that the claim of non-con-

senting bondholders for the value of the defaulted old bonds and coupons had been legitimately precluded by the state legislation. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute the Court's analysis centered
on whether the value of the bondholders' contract had been reduced

not merely in theory but in practice.5 8 The Court was particularly impressed with how "empty" the unsecured bondholders' 59 remedy had
become in the face of Asbury Park's insolvency."

It noted that the

What controls our judgment . . . is the underlying reality rather than the form
of label. The changes of remedy now challenged as invalid are to be viewed
in combination, with the cumulative significance that each imparts to all. So
viewed they are seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly
all the incidents that give attractiveness and value to collateral security. Id.
at 62.
53. "The necessity compelled by unexpected financial conditions to modify an
original arrangement for discharging a city's debt is implied in every such obligation for
the very reason that thereby the obligation is discharged, not impaired." 316 U.S. at
511. See also id. at 509-13.
54. Id. at 516. Indeed, it was found that the legislation actually increased the value
of the obligee's claim.
55. id. at 503.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 506, 507.
58. Id. at 514. The Court asked whether the value of the contract had been reduced
. in the realm of actualities and not of abstractions and paper rights, of what things
are worth in dollars and cents, and in what is proposed to realize paper values." Id.
59. The Court was careful to confine its decision to the facts before it, noting
specifically that "we are not here concerned with legislative changes touching secured
claims." Id. at 516.
60. Id. at 514. Cf. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934)
wherein the Court stated that "the statute does not impair the integrity of the mortgage
indebtedness" (emphasis added).
In Blaisdell the Court placed overwhelming emphasis on defining the state's
"emergency power" and the scope of its proper exercise when existing contracts are
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principal asset of a municipality is its power to tax, a power which is
"wholly subordinate to the unrestrained power of the State over polit-

ical subdivisions of its own creation."' 61 In addition, the remedy of
mandamus, as used to instruct city officials to levy and collect taxes,
was seen by the Court as a futile exercise which historically had re-

sulted in the recalcitrant officials' resignation or imprisonment for contempt.62

In view of this situation, the Court held that to strike down a

statute which forced a reasonable composition63 on non-consenting
holders of such bonds would be to conclude, in effect, "that the right
to pursue a sterile litigation is an 'obligation' protected by the Constitu-

tion of the United States.

' 64

Thus Faitoute reaffirms the pragmatically

oriented standard of impairment developed in the early cases and, in

applying it, confirms that "a law reducing the scope of what will constitute satisfaction may be valid if it has a compensating effect in
'65
strengthening the practical efficacy of the remedy.
affected. See notes 123-27, 180-83 infra and accompanying text. The Court, therefore,
assumed that the statute in question caused at least a technical impairment; otherwise
there would have been no need to justify it by invoking the police/emergency power
doctrine. The observation that the "integrity" of the obligation was not impaired
appears in the context of a discussion leading to the Court's finding that the legislature's
exercise of its emergency power was "not. . .unreasonable." 290 U.S. at 445.
61. 316 U.S. at 509.
62. "For there is no remedy when resort is had to 'devices and contrivances' to
nullify the taxing power which can be carried out only through authorized officials." Id.
at 511, citing Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 124 (1873). This,
said the Faitoute Court, was the lesson taught by the depressions of 1873 and 1893. 316
U.S. at 510.
63. The Court contrasted the value-preserving aspects of the composition arrangement complained of in Faitoute with the legislation challenged in W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935). In that case, the statute had significantly weakened
the process by which bondholders of a municipal improvement district could enforce
payment of assessments for their benefit and reduced incentives for property owners to
pay their assessments. Id. at 60-61. (See note 130 infra for a description of the specific
statutory alterations.) While in Faitoute the bonds were unsecured obligations, existing
security in Worthen in the form of a remedy against the property of tax delinquents had
been adversely affected by the state act. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury
Park, 316 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1942). While the statute in Worthen had resulted in "an
oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents that give attractiveness
and value to collateral security," 295 U.S. at 62, the Court in Faitoute found that due
legislative regard for creditors' interests had resulted in a composition plan which
actually enhanced the value of the bondholders' claims. 316 U.S. at 516.
64. 316 U.S. at 510-11.
65. Hale, supra note 3, at 555. The author also interpreted Faitoute as requiring
generally that:
The scope of the performance which the obligation calls for must be considered
in connection with the efficacy of the means for inducing performance or with
the substitute which the law gives for nonperformance, before it can be determined whether any statute impairs the obligation. Id.
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A corollary of the proposition that an obligation has been impaired
when its practical value has been decreased is that an obligation is not
impaired by the alteration or even the repeal of a contractual remedy
if another remedy exists which affords equally adequate protection for
the value of the obligation."" One series of cases, collectively known
as the "deficiency judgment" cases,67 however, has gone one step fur66. The particular remedy existing at the date of the contract may be altogether abrogated if another equally effective for the enforcement of the obligation remains or is substituted for the one taken away. Richmond Mortgage
& Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 30G U.S. 124, 128-29 (1937),
citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934).
Recognition and oblique articulation of this corollary goes back at least as far as
Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. 203 (1880), wherein the Court, in upholding the
statute involved, see notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text, noted that the city's
creditor could pursue other remedies for collection which had been left intact by the
legislation. 102 U.S. at 207.
Despite its statement of principles consistent with the earlier cases, the Wachovia
Court found no impairment even though the practical value of the contract to the obligee
at the time it was sought to be enforced was apparently decreased by the challenged
legislation. The North Carolina statute at issue in Wachovia altered a pre-existing
statutory scheme which had allowed a mortgagee who purchased his mortgagor's pledged
property at a judicial sale to recover as a deficiency judgment the difference between the
price he bid at the sale and the amount of the debt still owed. The legislative alteration
provided that, in an action at law, the mortgagee's deficiency judgment would be
determined by the jury on instructions that the deficiency should be limited to the
difference between the fair market value at the date of sale and the amount of debt yet
unpaid. 300 U.S. at 126-27, 129-30. The Court found that the mortgagee's pre-existing
rights were adequately protected by the availability of the traditional equitable defaultforeclosure remedy. Id. at 131; accord, Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539, 543 (1938)
(upholding constitutionality of New York statute denying deficiency judgment to purchasing mortgagee when real value of property was equal to debt secured on ground that
statute "in substance assured to the court the exercise of its appropriate equitable
powers"). The Wachovia Court likened the new procedure for obtaining deficiency
judgments to the traditional equitable action, noting that the latter does not provide
absolute protection for the mortgagee either, because a court of equity normally can
refuse to confirm a judicial sale on equitable grounds where the sale was unfair or where
an inadequate price was bid. 300 U.S. at 131. See also Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S.
539 (1938) (same characterization of foreclosure action in equity).
As a general proposition, however, the equitable remedy is probably considerably
less favorable to the mortgagor than the Court suggested. See 4a COLLiER ON BANKRUPTCY M70.98[17], at 1180-92, 1187-93 (14th ed. 1962). See also Gelfert v. National
City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 232 (1941) (recognizing the carefully restrained character of
the equitable action for a deficiency judgment). Moreover, even if the challenged statute preserved a remedy which was coextensive with the traditional equitable process,
neither remedy would have given the mortgagee the protection and advantage of the
statute which existed at the time the mortgage was executed. That earlier statute--one
which had no practical obstacle to its use at the time the mortgagee sought to enforce
his remedy-placed the risk of obtaining a poor price at a judicial sale (whether because
of a depressed economy or otherwise) on the mortgagor. Neither the altered legislative
scheme nor the action at equity, even as characterized by the Court, preserved this risk
allocation, a feature of the contract which gave it extra value to the mortgagee. Hence,
though Wachovia purported to apply well established principles, its result seemingly allows a literal impairment of the mortgagee's contract rights.
67. Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941); Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306
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ther and permitted alteration of an obligee's remedy even though the
new remedy is less desirable than the old, so long as the altered remedy

still allows recovery of as much or more than the obligee could have
obtained if the contract had been fully performed. 68 More particularly,
the deficiency judgment cases sanctioned state legislation designed to
reduce or eliminate the advantage which accrued to mortgagees during

the Great Depression as a result of drastically depressed prices of real
property. The effect of the Court's decision in each case was to allow
states to prevent mortgagees from taking advantage of the allocation

of risks, as prescribed at the time of the making of the contract, which
were to obtain in case of the mortgagor's default.6 9 The Court explicitly refused to "dignify into a constitutionally protected right [the mortgagees'] chance to get more than the amount of their contracts,"' 0 insisting that "mortgagees are constitutionally entitled to no more than

payment in full."' 71 Thus, if the holding of the deficiency judgment
U.S. 539 (1939); Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937); Richmond Mortgage &
Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937).
68. Hale, supra note 3, at 551.
69. The facts of Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
300 U.S. 124 (1937) are discussed in note 66 supra.
In the next deficiency judgment case to reach the Supreme Court, Honeyman v.
Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937), a statute was upheld which provided that during an
emergency period an action to recover a deficiency judgment for indebtedness secured by
a mortgage could not be maintained after the mortgaged premises were sold unless the
right to the deficiency judgment were determined in the foreclosure action. Id. at 377.
Hence, since the right to a deficiency judgment was to be determined before the judicial
sale, the question whether there was to be an additional recovery had to be decided on
the basis of the "value" of the mortgaged property, not on the amount it would bring at a
judicial sale, as would have been the case under the former legislation.
Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939), involved a review of a New York statute
denying a mortgagee who purchased at a foreclosure sale the right to a deficiency
judgment when the state court found that the real value of the property sold was equal to
the debt secured by the mortgage. Id. at 540-41. The constitutionality of the statute
was upheld on the rationale that it "in substance assured to the court the exercise of its
appropriate equitable powers." Id. at 543.
Finally, in Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941), the Court upheld a
non-emergency statute which denied a mortgagee who purchased at a foreclosure sale the
right to a deficiency judgment when the value of the property was found to be equal to
the debt secured by the mortgage. The statute applied to all actions for a deficiency
judgment and the Court agreed that no remedy existed which was "substantially
coextensive" with the pre-existing laws basing calculation of the amount of deficiency
due on the price the property brought at a judicial sale. Id. at 229-30.
70. Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 234 (1941).
71. Id. at 233; accord, Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1939). See also
Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937):
The act alters and modifies one of the existing remedies for realization of
the value of the security, but cannot fairly be said to do more than restrict
the mortgagee to that for which he contracted, namely, payment in full. Id.
at 130.
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cases, read in conjunction with Faitoute, is generalized, an impairment
will be found only if a remedy is altered to such an extent that the
complaining party's recourse is less practically efficacious and is of less
72
value than actual performance of the contract.

In light of this formulation, it is now possible to analyze the two
recent cases described at the beginning of this section.73 In Patterson
v. Carey,7 4 the toll rollback from twenty-five to ten cents for a maxi-

mum period of 120 days was alleged to be an impairment of a contract
which empowered a State Parkway Authority to charge and collect tolls
for the benefit of the Authority's bondholders. Though the bonds
were to be paid from parkway revenues, the trial court had found that
the loss of revenue occasioned by the 120-day rollback would not "enThe
danger the security of the bonds or precipitate a default. . . .

Appellate Division concluded, nevertheless, that the state's infringement on the power of the Parkway Authority to set tolls according to

its own determination of needs and obligations constituted an impairment. 70

Under the practical value definition of impairment, the court's

conclusion seems to have been based on insufficient evidence.

The

rollback imposed constraints on the decision-making power of the Au-

thority which were ephemeral and extremely limited. According to a
72. The deficiency judgment cases have been interpreted as altering the concept that
the law of the time and place of the contract's execution becomes a part of the contract:
[Honeymtan v. Jacobs] seems to imply a new corollary to the time-honored
rule that the law of the time and place where the contract was executed becomes a part of the contract. That is, if the Court finds that a given law
(which is deemed part of the contragt) imposes an unconscionable burden
or gives undue advantage to one of the parties, it will refuse to allow that
law constitutional immunity against change. 39 COLJM. L. REv. 1227, 1231
(1939).
Some of the dicta in the deficiency judgment cases, most of them in the inflammatory
Gellert opinion, tend to support this interpretation:
[The legislative formula for determining the amount of a deficiency judgment]
which exists at the date of the execution of the mortgage does not become
so embedded in the contract between the parties that it cannot be constitutionally altered. Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 231 (1941).
The Federal Constitution does not undertake to control the power of a
State to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligations be enforced, provided the method of procedures gives reasonable notice
and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided. Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375, 378 (1937), quoted in Gellert, 313 U.S. at
235.
However, case law both before and since the deficiency judgment cases does not
comport with this interpretation. For conflicting cases decided prior to the deficiency
judgment cases, see note 11 supra. The most important of the later cases is City of El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965) (recognizing that "existing laws [are] read
into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties").
73. See notes 16-28 supra and accompanying text.
74. 52 App. Div. 2d 171, 383 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1976).
75. id. at 176, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
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finding of fact accepted by the court, the state's superimposed decision
regarding the toll rate did not result in a reduction of the value of the
bondholders' contract rights. 77 Thus the court's finding of impairment
could not have rested on the substance of the legislative directive, but
must have been prompted by the bare fact that the Authority's decisionmaking power had been overridden in technical violation of the state's
agreement. 7 8 There was no mention by the court of any effect on the
actual value of the bonds which resulted from the temporary removal
of the Parkway Authority's rate-setting discretion. Absent such a
showing, the mere formal alteration of a contract right"9 by a state
should not be subject to contract clause challenge.80 As to the provision of the challenged legislation requiring a 120-day waiting period
for review and public hearings before any future toll increase could be
implemented by the Authority,81 the court found. that these requirements did not affect the Parkway Authority's "ultimate and unfettered
power" to determine toll charges.8 2 The court's argument for impairment on the sole basis of a change in the Authority's powers was therefore inapplicable to the review-period provision. In addition, the court
determined that the security of the bonds was not affected by this portion of the law because the final toll charge arrived at by the Authority
could take into account delay in implementation.83 Given these findings,8 4 the court's conclusion that the review-period provision did not
impair bondholders' contract rights is consistent with the practical impact approach to impairment.
The issue in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 5 as previously
noted,86 was whether an impairment was effected by repeal of a legis77. Id. at 178, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 419.

See notes 91-93 infra and accompanying text

for a discussion of the relationship between reduction of contract security and impairment.
78.

52 App. Div. 2d at 175, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 416.

79. See City of

Paso v. Simmons, 379

497, 515-17 (1965).

See notes 136-

48 infra and accompanying text.

80. See Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. 203, 207 (1880).

See notes 45-47

supra and accompanying text.

52 App. Div. 2d at 177, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 418-19.
82. Id. at 178, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
Id.

84. If this review-period delay were significantly lengthened, it would seem that the
flexibility of the Authority to respond to changing needs would be so restricted as to
endanger the value of the bonds. It is unclear from the opinion whether the court might
have reached a different result had the review period been longer.

85. 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833
prob. juris. noted, 96

Ct.

See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.

affd

514,
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lative convenant with bondholders of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey which had limited use of the revenues of the Port Au-

thority to preclude support of certain passenger railroads if the Authority's losses exceeded a certain permitted deficit.8 7 It is clear that the
repeal of the covenant would have constituted an impairment if its
operation had prevented the bonds or their coupons from being paid.88
As the case came to trial, interest on the bonds was continuing to be

paid and the principal obligations were not yet due; 89 these facts alone,
however, were not determinative of whether the continuing value of the
obligations would be lessened or whether they would be worth less at
maturity. The New Jersey Superior Court did not make an explicit
finding on these issues, though it conceded "the existence of some impairment of bondholder security as a result of the repeal."9 0
The ultimate value of the contract measured in terms of its future

performance or enforceability would seem to depend on the only available present measure of that value-the practical likelihood that the
obligation would be met. 9 ' The precedents already discussed indicate
that a contract's security provisions may be altered to the obligee's det92 riment so long as replacement security of equal value is substituted.
87. 134 N.J. Super. at 161-63, 338 A.2d at 854-55. The "permitted deficit" was
defined as an amount not exceeding (A) the amount of passenger railroad deficit which
New York or New Jersey was willing to guarantee, plus (B) the greater of (1) an
amount equal to ten percent of the general reserve fund less an amount equal to one
percent of the Authority's bonds outstanding which were issued for passenger rail
purposes, or (2) an amount equal to ten percent of the amount calculated under clause
(1) plus one percent of the Authority's equity in all facilities other than passenger rail
facilities. Id. at 162-63, 338 A.2d at 855.
88. In Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866), the Court
held that there had been an impairment on a finding that as a result of state legislation
the city could not collect sufficient taxes to pay the bond debt. Id. at 554. See notes
37-42 supra and accompanying text.
89. Moody's and Standard and Poor's continued to rate Authority bonds as "A"
bonds even after repeal of the covenant. 134 N.J. Super. at 179, 338 A.2d at 864.
90. Id. at 195, 338 A.2d at 873.
91. In Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. 203 (1880), the "security" of the
claimant's contract could almost certainly be said to have been threatened by legislation
limiting creditors' recoveries to a specific fund set aside in the city budget. Id. at 205-06.
See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text. The Court nevertheless upheld the
statutory alteration since the creditor's immediate opportunity for full recovery was not
affected. Obviously, since the bondholders who brought suit in United States Trust did
not have mature claims for the principal of the Authority's debt, the fact that they may
not have been under an immediate disadvantage does not imply the same result as that
which obtained in Louisiana v. New Orleans.
92. The cases discussing whether or not an impairment has occurred when one of
several available remedies has been altered or repealed state that if an alternative remedy
remains which affords equally adequate protection there has been no impairment. See,
e,g., Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124,
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Repeal of the negative convenant in United States Trust, however, was

unaccompanied by substitution of any additional security."

The legis-

lative repeal allowed a reduction of the "general reserve fund" 94 which

was pledged as security for payment of interest and principal on the
bonds and permitted the Authority's application of revenues to meet
passenger railroad deficits.95 Though Port Authority revenues and reserves had in fact increased in the several years prior to the repeal,"

such a favorable trend should not qualify as substitute security since
it was arguably dependent on the railroad deficit restrictions provided
by the negative covenant. Moreover, witnesses at the trial testified
that they would not have purchased or recommended purchase of the
bonds "at the price which they were then offered" if the legislative cov97
enant had not then been in effect.

Considering all of these factors of valuation, there is little doubt that
future performance of the debt obligations was less secure, and the

court was therefore justified in concluding that the repeal legislation
challenged in United States Trust did result in an impairment as that

term is used in article I, section 10 of the Constitution. Final disposition of this case must await the Supreme Court's impending interpreta-

tion. Nevertheless, as will presently be discussed,98 this "impairment"
should be constitutionally proscribed despite application of the "police
power doctrine".
128-29 (1937); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 430 (1934). See
note 66 supra and accompanying text. If two types of security were provided in a
contract and one type was removed by state legislation, however, it would seem
unreasonable to say that the value of the contract had not been diminished. While
duplication of remedy in most instances provides an alternative, duplication of security is
usually considered cumulative-that is, a contract would be deemed more secure and of
greater value merely because of the presence of two types of security, even though each
might be valued as equivalent to the other. For example, if a creditor takes a mortgage
on two of his debtor's houses, each of equivalent value and each sufficient alone to cover
the full amount of the debt, he may be very glad to have the duplicate security when the
debtor intentionally burns down one of the houses and the insurance company refuses
:payment.
93. The legislature provided no substitute for the repealed covenant. United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (1975), aff'd, 69 N.J. 253,
353 A.2d 514, prob. furis, noted, 96 S.Ct. 3188 (1976).
94. The covenant had protected the Authority's revenues and reserves from being
depleted for the support of passenger railroads operating at a significant deficit. 134
N.J. Super. at 161-63, 338 A.2d at 854-55.
95. Id. at 140-41, 338 A.2d at 842.
96. Id. at 195, 338 A.2d at 873 n.43.
97. Id. at 179, 338 A.2d at 864.
98. See notes 168-78 infra and accompanying text. Oral argument in United States
Trust was heard in November, 1976. 45 U.S.LW. 3362 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1976).
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The Police Power
Even though state legislation has technically effected an impair-

ment of contractual obligations, an act will not be deemed constitutionally proscribed if it is a proper exercise of the state's police power.

The theoretical basis for this judicial analysis was first expressed in
Stone v. Mississippi.9 The police power exception was supported as
a means of preserving for the states the governing power entrusted to
them by the people. It was recognized that the states possessed "discretion . . . in respect to matters the government of which, from the

very nature of things, must 'vary with varying circumstances.' "100
for allowing exercise of the
Since Stone v. Mississippi, the justification
1

"protective power of the State"'' even when the value of an existing
contract is thereby reduced has been variously expressed as: a recognition that the state cannot bind itself to a course of action which is
10 2
deleterious to its inhabitants' peace, good order, health or morals;
a declaration that all contracts are written subject to the implied con99. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
100. id. at 820; see Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. City of Denver, 250 U.S. 241, 244
(1919); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914);
Butchers' Union Slaughter-house Co. v. Crescent City Live-stock Landing Co., 111 U.S.
746, 751 (1884).
In Stone v. Mississippi, legislation outlawing lotteries was challenged by a business
which the previous year had been chartered to run a lottery. It was the first case to rest
a decision upholding a state statute on the doctrine of inalienability of the state's police
power. Two prior Supreme Court cases, however, laid the groundwork for establishing
the principles of the police power doctrine, though their holdings were based on other
analyses. See Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878); Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S.
645 (1877). See generally Merrill, supra note 6.
Even earlier, efforts to suggest that the police power might serve as an excuse for
allowing states to renege on obligations they had made had been rebuffed by the Court.
For example, in The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51 (1865) the Court said:
It is argued, as a reason why courts should not be rigid in enforcing the contracts made by States, that legislative bodies are often overreached by designing men, and dispose of franchises with great recklessness.
If the knowledge that a contract made by a State with individuals is
equally protected from invasion as a contract made between natural persons,
does not awaken watchfulness and care on the part of law-makers, it is difficult to perceive what would. The corrective to improvident legislation is not
in the courts, but is to be found elsewhere. Id. at 74.
See also Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264, 266 (1872). One commentator has suggested that the Court's recognition of the primacy of the police power even in
the face of a contract clause challenge was encouraged by the abuses of reconstruction
legislatures in the South in contracting away the public welfare and by "an awakening
sensitiveness at the North to social advancement as against the claims of vested rights
.... " Merrill, supra note 6, at 660.
101. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 440 (1934).
102. Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 15 (1898); see
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667, 670 (1878).
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dition of the exercise of the state's police power; 1 1 3 a statement that
the proper exercise of the police power is a sovereign right of the state

which is superior to an individual's contract rights;'

and an approach

which cautions one who enters into contracts in an area of enterprise
which is already regulated that his agreements are subject to being affected by further legislation in that area.' 0 5 Whatever its theoretical
basis, the doctrine that the contract clause will not bar a proper exercise

of state police power is well established.
The Supreme Court has characterized the police power as "the
power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably neces-

sary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community."' 0 6 The Court has extended the definition to

clarify that the police power encompasses protection of the economic
welfare of the state, 1 7 and that this power may be exercised even

when economic well-being requires regulation of state political subdi08
visions' contracts with creditors.1
103. "Our decisions recognize that every contract is made subject to the implied
condition that its fulfillment may be frustrated by a proper exercise of the police power
" Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 108-09 (1938); see East New
...
York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945).
104. East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1945), quoting
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905). The Court characterized this expression of the police power doctrine as the more "candid statement." 326 U.S. at 232.
105. . . . [W]hen a widely diffused public interest has become enmeshed in
a network of multitudinous private arrangements, the authority of the State
'to safeguard the vital interests of its people' . . . is not to be gainsaid by
abstracting one such arrangement from its public context and treating it as
though it were an isolated private contract constitutionally immune from impairment." East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, supra, at 232 (citation
omitted).
See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).
106. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914). This
definition has its origins in the classic statement in Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814
(1879), that the police power encompasses "the preservation of the public health and the
public morals, and the protection of public and private rights." Id. at 820. The
conceptual basis of state police power in the federal system has been described as "the
residuum of governmental powers left to the states after subtracting that delegated to
the national jurisdiction ...... Merrill, supra note 6, at 657.
107. "[State authority to safeguard the vital interests of the people] is not limited to
health, morals and safety. It extends to economic needs as well." Veix v. Sixth Ward
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38-39 (1940). That case dealt with legislation
designed to preserve the stability of building and loan associations, "financial institutions
of major importance to the credit system of the State." Id. at 37.
108. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1942)
(if a state retains police power in the economic realm with respect to building and loan
associations, as established in Veix, the state certainly should have like power for
maintenance of political subdivisions); cf. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310
U.S. 32, 38 (1940).
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For the most part, the Court has not segmented the broad state
police power so as to set up contract clause barriers to its exercise in

any particular areas of its operation. One exception to this general rule
is the judicial willingness to allow states to make irrevocable guarantees
in the area of state tax exemptions. The Court has consistently held
that when a state grants a tax exemption to a corporation or fixes a
tax rate for a company, the contract clause prevents subsequent state
alteration of the exemption or rate. 10 0

Though blanket contract clause

protection of state tax exemption grants may be viewed as something
of an anomaly in the history of the Court's interpretation of the

clause, 1 0 the Court nevertheless has been reluctant to suggest that a
state may never bind itself irrevocably in any area which could be affected by its police power."' The rationale for refusing to curb a
state's partial surrender of the power to tax, "one of the highest and

most important attributes of sovereignty,"" ' could, theoretically, be ap109. See, e.g., City of Charleston v. Branch, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 470 (1872);
Tomlinson v. Branch, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 460 (1872); Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 264 (1872); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); cf.
Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854) (premise assumed though
decision based on matter of construction).
110. Compare B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 203-13, with id. at 179-80. See also id. at
209 (stating that the Supreme Court has also generally refused to apply the police power
doctrine to statutes abolishing monopolies). Though there have been some seemingly
general holdings to the effect that the contract clause protects from subsequent repeal a
municipality's agreement not to build or operate municipal utilities, Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453 (1906); Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water
Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898), and that the clause allows states to contract away police power
to fix rates for a set period of time, see Merrill, supra note 6, at 663-64 and cases cited
therein, these are isolated instances and the results may sometimes be explained on other
grounds. For example, the theory of proper exercise of police power developed in Walla
Walla suggests that the decision was based on a finding that the state had exercised that
power improperly.
111. "[Wle are not prepared to say that the legislature can make valid contracts on
no subject embraced in the largest definition of the police power." Butcher's Union
Slaughter-house Co. v. Crescent City Live-stock Landing Co., 111 U.S. 746, 750-51
(1884). On the other hand, the Court has been very clear in stating that some state
powers, for example the power of eminent domain, may never be contracted away. West
River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (power of eminent domain).
Dicta in Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1876), suggest that the state
might not be able to bind itself by statute not to create any further debt or not to issue
any more bonds, as such an engagement "involves, if binding, a surrender of a
prerogative which might seriously affect the public safety." Id. at 535. Likewise, a
complete surrender of the power to tax by a state might not be enforceable: "No
government dependent on taxation for support can bargain away its whole power of
taxation, for that would be substantially abdication." Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814,
820 (1879).
112. Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264, 267 (1872). But cf. Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S 814, 820 (1879) (complete surrender of state's taxing power
impermissible).
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plied to almost any manifestation of the police power:
[Tihe courts of the country are not the proper tribunals to apply the
corrective to improvident legislation of this character. If there be
no constitutional restraint on the action of the legislature on this subject, there is no remedy, except through the influence of a wise public
sentiment, reaching and controlling the conduct of the lawmaking
113
power.

Despite the breadth of the police power concept and the doctrine
which permits its exercise even when contractual obligations are technically impaired, its use is not unrestricted when pre-existing contract
rights are affected. A state's exercise of police power is proper only
when "the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures
taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.

111 4

The "legitimate

end" to which the legislature must address itself is the protection of
a basic interest of society," 5 as distinguished from purely private
rights." 6 It is not enough that the legislation merely relate to a subject
involving the public interest; the statute must be designed specifically
to protect public interests in that area.". 7 This judicial determination
113. Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264, 267 (1872). In fact, this is
exactly the reasoning which the Court did use to turn aside arguments that the states are
constitutionally allowed to impair contracts in the exercise of their police power. See
The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51, 74 (1865) quoted in note 100 supra.
114. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934); accord,
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 109 (1938); Treigle v. Acme Homestead
Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936).
115. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445 (1934); accord,
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 109 (1938).
116. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936).
117. In Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936), for example, a state
law was challenged which affected building and loan associations-corporations which
the Court characterized as "quasi-public." Id. at 197. The act in question gave
directors of such corporations broad discretion in protecting members' rights to receive
withdrawal payments from the association when fifty percent of the receipts of the
associations had previously been required to be set aside to pay withdrawing members.
Id. at 191-94, 196. The legislation was deemed by the Court to be inadequately adapted
to the "legitimate end of conserving or equitably administering the assets in the interest
of all members." Id. at 197-98. In other words, the legislation was not designed to
preserve the economic health of a quasi-public corporation, but was rather a direct effort
to alter the mutual rights of creditors and members of the corporation. Id. at 195-97.
In the view of the Court, "[sluch an interference with the right of contract cannot be
justified by saying that in the public interest the operations of building and loan
associations may be controlled and regulated .. " Id. at 196.
Four years after Treigle, another Supreme Court decision, Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940), called into question the continuing validity of
Treigle. The factual context in Veix was similar to that in Treigle. Veix involved a
statutory change whereby withdrawing members' rights were subordinated to payment of
matured shares in the association and the members' rights to sue for the withdrawal
value were eliminated. Id. at 34-35. At first it might be presumed that the same
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is similar to the nexus standard governing equal protection clause deter-

minations in areas where a suspect classification is not evident; 1 8 in
both areas of the law, the Court tends to avoid substituting its value

judgments for those of the legislature."'
This standard is applied by examining the legislative scheme's potential effect on the asserted state goal (already determined to be a

proper subject for the exercise of the police power) .120 If that effect furcriticism which led the Court to deny validity to the statute in Treigle would also have
applied to that in Veix, since the statutory alteration in the latter case, by creating
preferential rights for continuing association members, appeared also merely to alter
private rights in a quasi-public corporation. Without discussing any factual differences
between the two cases, however, the Veix Court summarily distinguished Treigle on its
facts, id. at 40-41, and reached the conclusion that "certainly the protection of building
and loan associations against the catastrophe of excessive withdrawal is, today, within
legislative power." Id. at 41.
The effect of the legislation in Treigle and in Veix cannot have been much different,
since in both cases the new legislation disadvantaged withdrawing members vis-a-vis
continuing association members and others with a contractual interest in the continuing
vitality of such corporations. Whether the Treigle Court viewed the statutory provisions
as too restrictive, 297 U.S. at 195-96 ("the sections in question do not contemplate the
liquidation of associations, the conservation of their assets or the distribution thereof
amongst creditors and members"), or not restrictive enough, id. at 195 ("the provisions
respecting the rights of withdrawing members are neither temporary nor conditional"),
to effect the purpose of protecting the public economic welfare, the divergent results of
Veix and Treigle point to the difficulty of judging whether the "relief afforded has
reasonable relation to the legitimate end to which the State is entitled to direct its
legislation." W.B. Worthen & Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934); see Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445 (1934) (legislative relief "could only
be of a character appropriate to that emergency").
118. Just as in the equal protection area there must be a rational relationship between
the legislative classification and the asserted legislative end, see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 466 (1957), in contract clause analysis there must be a rational
relationship between the legislative means and the goal of the exercise of the police
power.
119. "[The courts] will not inquire too closely into the motives of the State, but they
will not ignore the effect of its action." Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248, 253 (1906);
see East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 234 (1945).
In some contract clause cases, both early and recent, the Court has suggested that
the "motive" of the legislature should bear on whether its exercise of police power was
proper. In Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), Justice Johnson said
that "[I]t is the motive, the policy, the object, that must characterize the legislative act,
to affect it with the imputation of violating the obligation of contracts," Id. at 291,
quoted with approval in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 509 (1965).
The difficulty with this "motive" standard, of course, is that identical legislation
passed under identical economic and other public welfare conditions could conceivably
receive different treatment depending on the state of mind (if that could be determined)
of the people who drafted and voted on it. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), wherein the Court explains why "[ilnquiries into congressional motives or
purposes are a hazardous matter." Id. at 383.
120, Cf. Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1898).
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thers the legislative end, the statute has met one step of the test to determine whether the police power has been properly exercised. 21
Even if the legislation in question is reasonably related to an acceptable
public end, its provisions must also reflect legislative moderation. This
requirement of a spirit of moderation has been said to arise from the
necessity of construing the scope of the police power in harmony with
1 22
the "fair intent" of the contract clause limitation.
, Of course, the problem of reconciling
the breadth of state police
power with the restrictions imposed on state action by constitutionally
protected individual rights is not unique to contract clause decisions.
In the first amendment and due process areas, for example, the Court
has developed similar tests which give latitude to asserted state interests
while at the same time attempting to give effect to constitutional pronouncements protecting individual rights. Development of such a test
requiring moderate exercise of state police power when contracts are
thereby affected began as a process of defining limits beyond which
a legislature cannot go in altering contractual obligations.
The seminal case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blais-

dell'23 set one limit of legitimate state legislative activity when it insisted
that the contract clause "precludes a construction [of state power]
which would permit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation of
debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce
them."' 124 In Blaisdell, however, the spirit of moderation was held to
have been honored in the statute at issue which extended mortgagors'
redemption rights and called a moratorium on foreclosures for a period
of not more than two years. 2 5 The Court was impressed that the legislation did not ignore the interests of mortgagees; because the mortgagor was required to pay rent while he remained in possession during
the redemption period, the mortgagee remained entitled to a deficiency
judgment and the "integrity of the mortgage indebtedness" was preserved. 126 In sum, the Court found that "the relief afforded by the
statute has regard to the interest of mortgagees as well as to the inter11 7
est of mortgagors. 2
121. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
122. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934).
123. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See note 49 supra.

124. 290 U.S. at 439; accord, W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433
(1934). The Blaisdell Court did recognize, however, that a temporary restraint of
contract enforcement might be "within the range of the reserved power of the State to
protect the vital interests of the community." 290 U.S. at 439; see also id. at 445.
125. The legislation was enacted in 1933 and, by its terms, could not remain effective

beyond 1935. 290 U.S. at 415-16.
126. Id. at 445.

127. Id.
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In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court did void a state statute

on the ground that the legislative moderation which the contract clause
demands was disregarded. Challenged in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh' 28 was legislation effecting procedural changes in the means by

which holders of municipal improvement district bonds could enforce
payment of mortgage-secured assessments made on property within the

district. 120 What had formerly been a summary enforcement process
was statutorily altered to extend over a minimum of six and one-half
years. 110 In sustaining the constitutional challenge, the Court stated
what it considered to be the least demanding standard of moderation

required for protection of the victim of an impairment.' 3 ' The Court
held that even when public welfare was arguably served by contractimpairing legislation, the bounds of moderation were certainly passed
when the statute suggested "studied indifference to the interests of the
mortgagee or to his appropriate protection" which resulted in a removal
from the obligee's contract of "the quality of an acceptable investment
2
for a rational investor."' 3
128. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
129. The municipal improvement district was organized under Arkansas law and was
empowered to issue bonds and to mortgage benefit assessments as security for them. The
bearer bonds in question were so secured and the mortgage was accompanied by a copy
of the assessment of benefits stating in detail the amount of the benefits assessed against
each piece of property in the district. Id. at 57. The case arose when, after the
municipal district had defaulted on the bonds, the trustee for the bondholders and
representative bondholders brought suit to foreclose the assessments on lots of delinquent
owners. Id.
130. The Arkansas legislature passed three laws altering the plan to enforce payments
of assessments. Among the procedural changes were the following:
-The time allowed for payment after notice to the taxpayer was extended
from thirty days to ninety days.
-The penalty for non-payment was reduced from twenty percent to three percent.
-The time allotted to appear and answer after notice was extended from five
days to six months.
-The time allowed for the case to be made ready for hearing was extended
from fifteen days to six months.
-The decree could allow the taxpayer twelve months for payment instead
of the previously allotted ten days. Thereafter the property could not be
sold for six months whereas a hiatps of only twenty days was provided
under prior law.
-Under both statutes the property could be redeemed but the later statute
changed the interest rate charged from twenty percent to six percent.
-The section which had allowed the purchaser of the property to go into
possession for the redemption term without accountability for rents if the
redemption should occur was repealed. Id. at 58-59.
The Court found that the newly required enforcement process would take a minimum of
six and one-half years (including the redemption period). Id. at 61.
13 1. Id. at 60.
132. Id.
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Blaisdell and Worthen served only to set the constitutional limits
of a legislature's ability to impair contracts in the exercise of its police
power.' 3 '

Working within these limits, City of El Paso v. Simmons

'4

.

included an extensive discussion of the nature of the required spirit of
moderation.

The Court examined the effect of legislative interference

on rights of contracting parties and inquired whether the state had interfered with such rights to an extent greater than that needed to meet

its police power goals. 13 5
In El Paso, the Court considered the obligations arising under a
long-term contract for the sale of land by the state of Texas. The con-

tract specified means by which purchasers who defaulted and forfeited
land back to the state could have their claims reinstated at any time,
unless the rights of third parties had intervened.' 3 6 In order to deter

speculation in mineral rights by use of the reinstatement provision,
Texas later passed a law limiting to five years the time in which rein3
statement rights under such contracts could be exercised.' T
The El Paso Court apparently assumed that the buyer's contract
rights were impaired by the legislation, in the sense of being reduced

in value, 3 ' and acknowledged the police power doctrine and its "reasonable and appropriate" requirement.

39

In evaluating the severity

of the legislation's impact on the real estate purchasers' original con133. See id.

134. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
135. Id. at 509-17.
136. See text accompanying note 148 infra.
137. 379 U.S. at 499. Under the statute, "forfeited purchase contracts which had
remained dormant for years could be reinstated if and when the land became potentially
productive of gas and oil." Id. at 512.
138. Id. at 508. The Court explicitly assumed "the provision for reinstatement after
default to be part of the State's obligation .... ." Id. The Texas Court of Appeals had
determined on the basis of Texas law that the statute in question effected "a change in
the obligation of a contract," id. at 505-06, and concluded on the basis of that finding
that the law violated the contract clause. Id. at 506. By accepting the Texas court's
state law conclusion, the Supreme Court implicitly accepted the finding of an "impairment" in the reduction in value of the contract to the obligee. The Court nevertheless
found error in the lower court's failure to consider the effect of the state's police power
in determining whether the impairment was constitutionally proscribed. The Court was
careful to emphasize, immediately after accepting the state court's interpretation of Texas
law, that the contract clause "prohibition is not an absolute one." Id. at 508, quoting
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934).
Compare the dissent of Justice Black in El Paso, 379 U.S. at 528-35, wherein he
interpreted the opinion of the Court as acknowledging that there had been an impairment
but as giving effect to the legislation because "this impairment [did] not seem to the
Court to be very serious or evil ...... Id. at 521 (Black, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 508-09, quoting East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233
(1945). See notes 114-21 supra and accompanying text.
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tract rights, the Court first determined that the promise of unlimited
opportunity for reinstatement could not have been "the central undertaking of the seller nor the primary consideration for the buyer's undertaking." 14 0 This conclusion was supported primarily by the fact that
at the time the parties executed the contract, reinstatement rights could
not have been conceived of as an "endless privilege" because it was

the state's policy to sell forfeited land as quickly as possible. 141 Moreover, the speculative value of maintaining an interest in land until its
value increased with the discovery of mineral deposits was viewed by
the Court as an "unforeseen" benefit which accrued to the purchaser
over the years.' 42 The speculative nature of this portion of the consideration received was emphasized because "laws which restrict a
party to those gains reasonably to be expected from the contract are

not subject to attack under the Contract Clause.' 1 43

Taking into ac-

count both of these factors, the Court found that the five-year period
allotted for a defaulting buyer's reinstatement reasonably protected

whatever rights the buyer contemplated acquiring.144

Thus, the Court

concluded that the statute temporally limiting reinstatement "was a

mild one indeed, hardly burdensome to the purchaser who wanted to
adhere to his contract of purchase ... .

A further factor considered in determining whether the real estate
140. 379 U.S. at 514. In his dissent, Justice Black severely criticized the Court's
conclusion that the reinstatement rights were not of central importance to the buyers:
To my way of thinking it demonstrates a striking lack of knowledge of credit
buying and selling even to imply that these express contractual provisions safeguarding credit purchasers against forfeitures were not one of the greatest,
if not the greatest, selling arguments Texas had to promote purchase of its
great surfeit of lands. The Court's factual inference is all the more puzzling
since its opinion emphasizes that many people entered these contracts for speculative purposes which without the redemption provision would not have been
nearly so attractive. Id. at 530 (Black, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 515.
142. Id.
143. Id. The Court supported this proposition by citing several of the deficiency
judgment cases, including Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939), and Gelfert v.
National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941). While the deficiency judgment cases do
confine an obligee to a remedy which is of a value no greater than he would have gained
by his obligor's performance, see notes 67-72 supra and accompanying text, they do not
fully support the El Paso Court's proposition that contracting parties may be allowed to
avoid performance which becomes more burdensome than that which was originally
foreseeable without a contract clause violation, see 379 U.S. at 515. The cases are
distinguishable, however, as El Paso sets a standard for legislative moderation, while the
deficiency judgment cases define what will be considered a technical impairment.
144. "The five-year limitation allows defaulting purchasers with a bona fide interest
in their lands a reasonable time to reinstate. It does not and need not allow defaulting
purchasers with a speculative interest in the discovery of minerals to remain in endless
default while retaining a cloud on title." Id. at 516-17.
145. Id. at 517.
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purchasers were treated with "studied indifference" was that in light
of the state's interest in cutting short the period of reinstatement,14
"a statute of repose was quite clearly necessary."' 14 7 Obviously, if the
legislature interferes with contractual obligations only to the extent
"clearly necessary" for the protection of state interests, it is acting as
moderately as its asserted public goals allow. In searching for this type
of correlation between legislative means and ends, it is apparent that
the Court may inquire whether alternative means which would impose
a lesser impairment are available to the state. In El Paso the legislation was not only "reasonable and appropriate," but also was uniquely
related to a proper state end since the impairment it caused was "quite
clearly necessary." This showing that the legislature had interfered
with contract rights only to the extent necessary to achieve its police

power goals, along with the evidence that the effect of such interference on the purchaser's interests was in fact "mild," form the basis of
the El Paso Court's conclusion that the state's action reflected appropriate legislative moderation. 48
In both Patterson v. Carey4 and United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey 50 the respective defendants argued that the police power doc146. The Court described the state's objectives in enacting the legislation as (1)
obtaining revenues for the school fund, (2) efficient utilization of public lands, and (3)
encouraging compliance with contracts of sale-goals much different from the original
objective of encouraging settlement of land which prompted the state to grant unlimited
reinstatement rights to buyers. Id. at 516.
147. Id.
148. In his dissent in El Paso, Justice Black compared the majority's analysis to the
balancing of individual rights against state interests which the Court uses in fourteenth
amendment due process cases. Id. at 528-35 (Black, J., dissenting); cf. Hale, The
Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 3), 57 HARv. L. Ruv. 852, 890 (1944)
(suggesting even before El Paso that there was a "tendency for the contract clause and
the due process clause to coalesce"). See also Funston, supra note 3, at 358-59. Justice
Black considered that the Court had relied exclusively on "due process" balancing to the
exclusion of any other standard for determining whether an exercise of the police power
was "proper" in light of the contract clause. 379 U.S. at 521. However, the majority
did make conclusory statements as to the "reasonable relationship" between the legislation and the appropriate state purpose of safeguarding economic welfare. More importantly, the majority acknowledged the validity of that standard through its quotation of
the earlier cases. Id. at 508 (quoting extensively from Blaisdell, which the Court
characterizes as "a comprehensive restatement of the principles underlying the application of the Contract Clause"). Rather than conclude that El Paso impliedly overrules
the police power analysis of every contract clause decision since Blaisdell, id. at 521-22
(dissent of Black, J.), it is consistent with precedent to assume that El Paso's "due
process" balancing was an attempt to elaborate on the spirit-of-moderation limitation
referred to just prior to the discussion of the parties' respective interests. Id. at 509.
149. 52 App. Div. 2d 171, 176, 383 N.Y.S.2d 414, 418 (1976).
150. 134 N.J. Super. 124, 192-98, 338 A.2d 833, 872-75 (1975), af!'d per curiam, 69
N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514, prob. furis. noted, 96 S. Ct. 3188 (1976).
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trine justified the challenged legislative acts. In Patterson the New
York court held that the toll rollback was not reasonable and appropriate to the legislative end on the basis of which it was sought to be justified. 5 ' Representatives of the state argued that the toll rollback had
been enacted for the purpose of relieving the traffic congestion on local
streets which would result from motorists' attempts to avoid paying the
increased toll.15 2 Since the rollback was effective only for a period of
120 days the court found that the statute was related not to solving the

asserted problem,"6 3 but merely to postponing it. If the ultimate state
purpose was, in fact, the efficient operation of a system of roads, 54 no
showing was made that allowing 120 days for reconsideration before
implementing the toll increase would relate to that purpose. The conclusion of the majority was warranted because the state's means did not
appear to be directed to appropriate ends.
In the United States Trust Co. case, the challenged repeal of the

legislative covenant with Port Authority bondholders was defended on
the grounds that for fifty years New York and New Jersey had legislated to coordinate public and private transportation in the public interest,' 5 and that the public welfare demanded mass transit facilities to
help reduce air pollution and to alleviate the energy crisis.' 56 Though
the statute did not state a legislative intent to protect citizens' health,

safety and welfare, 15 7 such a statement of supporting rationale is unnecessary, 5 s especially since the courts avoid putting legislative motive
in issue. 15 Legislation which makes available more money for mass
transit' 6 ° clearly appears to be reasonably related to the asserted goals
151. 52 App. Div. 2d at 176-77, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. The dissenting judge in Patterson agreed that the price rollback merely postponed the problem, but suggested that the requisite reasonable relationship could be
found between the statute and what he perceived as the state's goal of providing an
interim during which a determination could be made as to whether the toll increase
would be in the public interest. Id. at 179, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 420 (Mahoney, J.,
dissenting). It is unclear, however, whether providing a longer time for weighing the
merits of proposed action is a proper goal of the police power.
155. 134 N.J. Super. at 194, 338 A.2d at 873.
156. Id. at 173-76, 338 A.2d at 861-63.
157. The intent and purpose of the act as stated therein was merely to repeal "the
covenant effectively preclud[ing] sufficient Port Authority participation in the development of a public transportation system in the port district." 1974 N.J. Laws, ch. 25, § 1;
see 134 N.J. Super. at 171-72, 338 A.2d at 860.
158. Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 235 (1941); United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 134 N.J. Super. at 195 n.44, 338 A.2d at 873 n.44.
159. For a discussion of the difficulty of analyzing the legislative motive, see note
119 supra.
160. The effect of the repeal of the statute was to allow the Port Authority to invest
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of alleviating pollution and energy problems. 16 1 Moreover, legislating
means of providing for public services such as mass transit has tradition1 2
ally been considered to be within the scope of the police power.
Having disposed of the reasonable and appropriate test, the New
Jersey court considered whether the legislative approach was acceptably moderate.

Applying the Worthen standard, 6 3 the court found

that abrogation of the legislative covenant did not destroy the quality of
Port Authority bonds as an "acceptable investment for a rational investor."'" 4 This conclusion was supported by evidence that Moody's and
Standard and Poor's did not alter their "A" ratings of the bonds after
the repeal of the covenant, 6 ' and by the fact that no witness was will-

ing to testify that he would not have purchased the bonds absent the
covenant. 166
The Worthen moderation standard, however, establishes only the
most lenient test for assessing the validity of state legislation.- 7
Judged in terms of the analysis developed in El Paso, the case for a

finding that the legislature acted moderately is much weaker.
In United States Trust there was less evidence than in El Paso that

the affected obligation was not the "primary consideration for the buyer's undertaking."'' 68 Though investors apparently would have purchased Port Authority bonds in the absence of the restrictive cove-

nant, 6" there was testimony which strongly suggested that some part of
in additional passenger railroad operations even though such operations might create a
deficit. By 1973 the financial situation of the Port Authority's passenger train operations was such that the Authority was precluded from pledging any of its revenues or
reserves to another deficit passenger railroad operation. 134 N.J. Super. at 165, 338
A.2d at 856.
161. The existence of this relationship was supported by statements (of which the
New Jersey Superior Court took judicial notice) taken from federal and state legislation
and from reports of agencies commissioned by the state. Id. at 173-75, 338 A.2d at 86162.
162. Cf. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. City of Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919);
Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914). See generally Wabash R.R. v. Defiance, 167
U.S. 88 (1897).
163. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935). See text accompanying notes 131-32 supra.
164. 134 N.J. Super. at 195-97, 338 A.2d at 873-74.
165. Id. at 179, 338 A.2d at 864.
166. Id.
167. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935).
168. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514 (1965).
169. 134 N.J. Super. at 179, 338 A.2d at 864. Based on this evidence alone, the New
Jersey court concluded that, although reliance existed, the covenant could not be said to
have been "primary consideration for purchase of the bonds." This conclusion is not
supported by El Paso, in which the Court concluded that the purchasers could not
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the consideration was paid for that legislative agreement. 170 Also, no
events had intervened between the time of the contract's execution and

the time of the covenant's repeal to give the bondholders unexpected
benefits. Thus, unlike in El Paso, the repeal legislation could not be
characterized as a means of merely "restrict[ing] a party to those gains
71
reasonably to be expected from the contract.'
In addition, the facts evident from the New Jersey court's opinion
do not reveal that repeal of the covenant was "quite clearly necessary"
for achieving the state's public welfare goals. As in El Paso, 72 the
state's interests had changed somewhat during the interim between the

making of the contract and its legislative alteration."7 3

Though the

rationally have paid anything for the perpetual reinstatement rights they were claiming
because state policies at that time assured that their reinstatement rights would be of
short duration. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514-15 (1965). In othel
words, in El Paso a right was found not to be primary consideration when there could
have been, at the time of execution of the contract, no realistic expectation of the right
which was abrogated. That case is not precedent for the New Jersey court's standard,
which apparently judged not whether the asserted right was primary consideration, but
whether it was the only consideration, for the evidence was clear that without the
covenant the bonds would have brought a lower price. 134 N.J. Super. at 179, 338 A.2d
at 864.
170. Witnesses testified that they would not have purchased or recommended purchase of the bonds "at the price which they were then [at the time of issuance] offered."
134 N.J. Super. at 179, 338 A.2d at 864.
Moreover, evidence as to whether the secondary market for the bonds was affected
by the repeal was inconclusive. Id. at 180-82, 338 A.2d at 865. The difficulty of
proving that the market price of the bonds was affected solely by repeal of the covenant
is obvious. The court found that "immediately following repeal and for a number of
months thereafter the market price for Port Authority bonds was adversely affected." Id.
at 180, 338 A.2d at 865. However, the evidence also suggested that the market decline
was not permanent since by the time of trial the market price differential between New
York-New Jersey Port Authority bonds and Massachusetts Port Authority bonds had
narrowed again to what it had been before the repeal. Id. The court also relied on
evidence that the bond price was affected by adverse publicity related to the financial
status of the Port Authority in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times. These
articles did not appear until August and November, respectively, however, while the
repeal legislation was passed in April. Id.
In making light of the importance to bondholders of the negative covenant, the
court also noted that the interest rates for Port Authority bonds issued subsequent to
repeal of the restrictive covenant were not higher than the rates on the series issued after
enactment of the legislative covenant but prior to its repeal. Id. at 179-80, 338 A.2d at
864-65. This evidence is not persuasive absent information on the relative prices at
which the series was issued. Moreover, as the court did mention, the series issued
shortly after the repeal of the covenant was indirectly protected by the fact that, should
the repeal be deemed an unconstitutional impairment, the Port Authority would be
obliged to refrain from exceeding the permitted deficit for passenger railroads until the
year 2007. Id. at 180, 338 A.2d at 865.
171. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965).
172. See id. at 514-15.
173. The state's concern at the time the bonds were issued was to obtain financing for
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metropolitan area's need for mass transit had increased unexpectedly due
to the energy crisis and new pollution standards, there was no showing
that the bondholders' protective covenant posed an insuperable barrier
to construction of new mass transit. The restrictive covenant did allow

the Port Authority to invest in self-supporting passenger railroads17 4 and
in addition provided that the Authority could incur an unlimited deficit
for mass transit if New York and New Jersey would guarantee payment
of part of that deficit. 7 5 Granting that the state's interest in construction of new mass transit facilities was great, it did not appear in the
evidence that the state was unable (or had even considered whether
it was unable) to construct needed passenger railroads without repeal
of the clause.

Thus, while additional security which was written into the bond7
holders' contract did remain unalteredy1
repeal of the legislative
hardly burdensome" measure as in El Paso.17 7
covenant was not a "mild,....
It was, rather, a total negation of a promise unaccompanied by a show-

ing that the state was unduly burdened by that promise. The repeal
was not designed to restore a balance of rights, but rather to lift responsibility from the shoulders of the Port Authority while burdening
the bondholders with greater risk.1 78 From the facts disclosed in
the failing Manhattan & Hudson Railroad and for construction of the World Trade
Center. 134 N.J. Super. at 159-61, 338 A.2d at 853. Repeal of the covenant was
specifically triggered by New York and New Jersey's desire to cooperate on building
passenger rail routes from Manhattan to the Newark and Kennedy airports. Id. at 171,
338 A.2d at 860.
174. 1962 N.J. Laws ch. 8, § 6; see 134 N.J. Super. at 162, 338 A.2d at 854.
175. 1962 N.J. Laws ch. 8, § 6; see 134 N.J. Super. at 163, 338 A.2d at 855.
176. The bonds were still secured by a pledge of the Authority's net revenues and
reserves. The surplus revenues derived by the Port Authority from all facilities built
with the proceeds of sale of its bonds were to be pooled so as to create a general reserve
fund in an amount equal to 10% of the par value of all bonds issued by the Authority.
134 N.J. Super. at 141, 338 A.2d at 842. In addition, the Consolidated Bond Resolution,
adopted on October 9, 1952 by the Authority, prohibited the issuance of new consolidated bonds unless the best one-year net revenues of all Port Authority facilities were
greater than or equal to 1.3 times the prospective debt service for the calendar year during which the debt service of all outstanding and proposed new bonds secured by a
pledge of general revenues would be at a maximum. Id. at 144, 338 A.2d at 843. The
Authority was also required to certify at such time as it issued any bonds secured by a
pledge of the general reserve fund with respect to any facility as to which the Authority
had not previously issued bonds that, during the next ten years or during the longest
term of the proposed bonds, the estimated expenditures in connection with the additional
facility would not impair the credit of the Authority, or its ability to fulfill its commitments, or the investment status of its consolidated bonds. Id. at 147, 338 A.2d at 845.
177. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 516 (1965).
178. The New Jersey court emphasized that the remaining security guarantees in the
bondholders' contract adequately protected them. 134 N.J. Super. at 196, 338 A.2d at
874. See note 176 supra. However, the court did concede that there had been "some
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the court's opinion, it does not seem that the enactment was either "mild"
in its treatment of bondholders' obligations or "quite clearly necessary"
to the public welfare, as required by the El Paso standards. Since
the police power of the state was not moderately exercised, therefore,
the covenant's repeal must have violated the contract clause.
III.

CREDITOR RELATIONS IN FINANCIAL
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

The considerations which determine whether state legislation during the period of a financial emergency violates the contract clause
closely resemble those discussed in the context of the state police
power. Under emergency circumstances, however, the constitutional
impairment formula undergoes some shift in emphasis.
In many contract clause cases, technical impairments of obligations have been excused on the ground that they result from a state's
exercise of its "emergency power."' 1 9 The Blaisdell Court noted that
"[e]mergency does not create power . . . [rather] emergency may
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power."' 18 0 It is consistent with
Blaisdell to describe emergency power as a specialized facet of state
police power. 181 Subsequent Supreme Court cases have interpreted
Blaisdell to mean that the state's police power extends not only to protection of public health, safety and morals, "but also to those extraordinary conditions in which a public disaster calls for temporary relief,"' 82 including economic conditions which create an "urgent public
8
need."', '
The courts have made state legislatures the primary arbiters of the
kinds of circumstances in which "emergency may furnish the occasion
impairment of bondholder security," id. at 195, 338 A.2d at 873. In fact, the repeal of
the covenant deprived bondholders of any assurances with respect to the amount of
deficit at which passenger railroad facilities would be expected to operate. See id. at
153-54, 338 A.2d at 849. The importance of the covenant was magnified by the fact
that the Port Authority had no general taxing powers. id.
179. See, e.g., East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); Home
Bldg, & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). But see W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934), wherein the Court declined to justify a state enactment
which impaired contract rights on the basis of the state's emergency powers.
180. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934). In
Blaisdell emergency power was described as a state power appropriate to extraordinary
conditions which may be deemed to be as much a part of all contracts as is the
reservation of police power. Id. at 439.
181. See 36 MICH. L. REv. 1379, 1382 (1938).
182. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934).
183. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 440 (1934); cf. W.B.
Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934).
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for the exercise of power. ' 18 4 Strong judicial deference is given to a
legislative declaration of the existence of an emergency situation, such
a determination being considered to lie uniquely within the realm of
legislative expertise.' 85 The cases indicate, however, that if a declaration of emergency could be "regarded as a subterfuge or as lacking in
adequate basis"'8s6 a court would refuse to recognize the existence of

an emergency situation. The courts do examine the underlying bases
for such a legislative declaration by a review of the legislative history 17
or by taking judicial notice of facts supporting the legislative conclusion.

s88

Having determined that the need to deal with an emergency situation is the permissible goal of particular state legislation, the courts will
then examine whether the statute which technically impairs contract
rights is "of a character appropriate" to that goal. 89 The courts re-

quire that the legislative action "must be limited by reasonable conditions appropriate to the emergency."'9 0 Whether an appropriate nexus
between a legislative enactment and an emergency situation exists often depends on whether the temporal scope of the legislation is coextensive with the temporal scope of the emergency. 19 In Blaisdell the

Court based its determination of the challenged statute's validity on
several criteria, one of which was that the legislation was temporary

and hence "limited to the exigency which called it forth."' 9 2

The

184. 290 U.S. at 426.
185. East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 234 (1945) ("Merely to
enumerate the elements that have to be considered shows that the place for determining
their weight and their significance is the legislature not the judiciary").
Such judicial deference has at times been severely criticized: "[The courts] could not
allow the legislative declaration of emergency to be conclusive without severely restricting the power of judicial review." 51 HARv. L. RFv. 1292 (1938). The courts do not
consider such a declaration conclusive, however. See text accompanying notes 186-88
infra.
186. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934).
187. See, e.g., East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1945).
188. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934).
189. Id. at 445; W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934).
199. 292 U.S. at 433. In Thomas, the Court declared void a state statute which
provided that moneys payable to a state resident as the insured or beneficiary under an
insurance policy would be exempt from liability or garnishment under judicial process
and exempt from application to payment of any debt. Id. at 429. The Court found that
this exemption from liability was not appropriate to the emergency sought to be
contained since it was not limited in amount, it did not include restrictions as to whether
beneficiaries must be state residents, and it did not include restrictions particularized
according to relevant circumstances. Id. at 431.
191. In Thomas, the Court also criticized the statute on the basis that it was not
limited as to time. Id. at 434.
192. 290 U.S. at 447.
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Court stated that emergency legislation "could not validly outlast the
emergency .... 193
After Blaisdell, much discussion appeared in the literature194 and
in state court decisions 9 ' as to whether the Supreme Court would be
willing to strike emergency legislation similar to that upheld in Blaisdell
on the ground that the emergency had passed. In East New York Savings
Bank v. Hahn "' the Court refused to do so, allowing the state to justify
an extension of such mortgage moratorium legislation by invoking state
interests other than those which supported the original emergency enactment.'9 7 On numerous occasions the Court also has upheld legislation which it considered to be of an emergency nature even when
no emergency was declared, 9 8 and perhaps when one did not actually
exist.'"" These cases indicate that the reasonable relationship standard is to be applied to a state's purported exercise of the emergency
power in much the same manner as it is applied to the state's exercise
of its general police power. If anything, the Court would likely be
more strict in its scrutiny of the temporal characteristics of emergency
legislation.2 °°
Although a state legislating in an emergency situation may be
more restricted with respect to the reasonable relationship standard, it
will surely be easier to show that it acted with moderation. The Blaisdell Court set a boundary on the extent to which contract rights may
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., 51 HAiv. L. RE v. 1292, 1293 (1938).
195. See generally Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Moore, 232 Ala. 488, 169 So. 1
(1936); National Bank of Aitkin v. Showell, 195 Minn. 273, 262 N.W. 689 (1935);
Wilson Banking Co. Liquidating Corp. v. Colvard, 172 Miss. 804, 161 So. 123 (1935)
(all upholding mortgage moratoria with the intimation that the legislation would be
invalid once the emergency ended).
196. 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
197. Id. at 235. The Court found a reasonable relationship between the emergency
mortgage moratorium legislation which had been extended and the state's interest in
preventing a new emergency which was expected to occur if normal mortgage liquidation,
prohibited for eight years, had suddenly been allowed to resume.
The Court has also upheld permanent legislation found to impair the value of
contracts but enacted as a means of repairing "weaknesses in the financial system" which
had been brought to light by the Depression. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
310 U.S. 32, 39 (1940).
198. In Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941), the Court sustained
legislation similar to that which had been upheld in Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539
(1939), as an exercise of emergency power, even though an emergency was not declared
by the legislature at the time the statute in Gelfert was passed. 313 U.S. at 235.
199. In Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 40 (1940), the Court
was not clear as to whether it considered that an actual emergency existed. See also
East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 235 (1945) (the Court allowed the
legislature to avoid a potential "emergency").
200. See notes 190-93 supra and accompanying text,
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be altered even in an emergency situation when it stated that emergency legislation calling a moratorium on enforcement of creditors'
rights could not validly "be so extended as virtually to destroy the contracts."12 11 It seems likely, however, that if the statute is deemed a
legitimate exercise of the police power, the state's interest in the legislation will be greater when the threat to the public welfare has reached
"emergency" proportions. Under the El Paso scheme for measuring
legislative moderation, 20 2 an emergency condition will no doubt make
any statute which is reasonably related to amelioration of the emergency seem "quite clearly necessary. 20 3
Two related cases decided in the wake of New York City's 1975
financial crisis illustrate that the circumstances of an actual financial
emergency may make it less likely that any impairment at all will result
from a state's alteration of contracts. In Flushing National Bank v.
Municipal Assistance Corp.204 and Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York,

°'

holders of New York City short-term revenue anticipation notes
brought suit to challenge the validity of the New York State Emergency
Moratorium Act.20 ' The Emergency Moratorium Act imposes a
three-year moratorium on enforcement of outstanding short-term obligations of New York City, with interest to be paid at the stated rate
until the notes mature and at an interest rate of six percent thereafter
until the principal is repaid.2 0 7 The Act gave noteholders the alter2 0-8
native of exchanging their short-term obligations for longer-term
debt obligations of the Municipal Assistance Corporation of New York
City.209 The federal district court and the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court which heard the two cases both upheld the
constitutionality of the Emergency Moratorium Act, viewing the legis201. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934).
202. See notes 140-48 supra and accompanying text.
203. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 516 (1965).
204. 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764, rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848,
390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
205. Civil Nos. 75-6169 and 75-6246 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1976).
206. 1975 N.Y. Laws chs. 874, 875; see 52 App. Div. 2d at 86, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 76566; Civil Nos. 6168, 6246, slip op. at 3.
207. 52 App. Div. 2d at 85-86, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
208. The MAC obligations were to have a maturity date of no more than twenty
years after issuance and could be "a bond, note or other evidence of indebtedness .
52 App. Div. 2d at 86 n.1, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 766 n.1.
209. 52 App. Div. 2d at 86, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 766; Civil Nos. 6168, 6246, slip op.
at 3. See 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 874, creating the Municipal Assistance Corp. for the City
of New York and empowering it to issue and sell its own bonds and notes and to render
financial assistance to the City by purchasing City obligations or making direct payments
to the City to defray its expenses. Id. §§ 3035, 3037.
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lation as a proper exercise of the police power.210 The New York
Court of Appeals has subsequently reversed the decision in Flushing
NationalBank on other grounds.21 '
An argument can be made, however, that the statute could also
have been vindicated on the ground that it caused no actual impairment
of noteholders' rights. When obligations are secured only by the general taxing power of a municipal corporation, the potential for enforcement of such obligations wears thin as the city approaches a financial
crisis. 212 The notes were "merely a draft on the good faith of a municipality in exercising its taxing power," 213 and the value of the noteholders' rights could be only as great as the value of a judgment against
the City, assuming that default was imminent. 21 4 Since the Emergency
Moratorium Act authorized six percent interest on the notes during the
period of the moratorium, while the interest rate allowed on accrued

claims or judgments against the City was three percent, 1 5 the rights
of noteholders under the Moratorium Act were worth at least as much
as an outstanding judgment against the City. Given these assumptions,
the practical value of the noteholders' contract rights was not reduced
210. 52 App. Div. 2d at 88, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 767; Civil Nos. 6168, 6246, slip op.
at 15-16.
211. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d
848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). The reversal was based on a provision of the New York
State Constitution which prohibits a city from contracting for indebtedness unless it
pledges its "faith and credit" for the payment of the principal of the indebtedness. N.Y.
CONST. art. VIII, § 2. Presumably the federal case challenging the Moratorium Act is
now moot and will be dismissed unless the New York state courts delay in enforcing
the city noteholders' rights or a judicial modification of the noteholders' remedy is
imposed.
212. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 509 (1942). See
notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
It was argued in Flushing Nat'l Bank that New York City had reached the point
at which its citizens "simply cannot or will not accept increasingly confiscatory tax
burdens or the growing danger and deprivation resulting from continued cuts in essential
services." Brief for Defendant-Respondent, Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp., 40 NY.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976) (brief submitted Aug. 6,
1976).
213. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 509 (1942).
214. Proof that a city would default rather than pay accruing debt obligations would
not be an easy task. It is complicated by the fact that the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to show an impairment of his contract rights. A determination that persons are
or are not able to meet their obligations as they come due is obviously within the
competence of the courts but its difficulty is greatly magnified when the "person" is a
government entity with power to tax. This difficulty may well serve to explain why
Flushing Nat'l Bank and Ropico were decided on the basis of the police power doctrine
rather than on technical impairment grounds. See text accompanying note 210 supra.
215. General Municipal Laws of New York City § 3-a. See Flushing Nat'l Bank v.
Municipal Assistanc Corp., 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 90, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764, 768 (1976).
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by the Emergency Moratorium Act and therefore no impairment was
effected by that statute.

If at some time during the statutory mora-

torium, however, the City were to be in a position to comply with the
original contract by paying the principal of the notes,21 0 noteholders

might then successfully claim a technical impairment.2 17
IV. BANKRUPTCY AND BEYOND
The final question, of course, is what steps can be taken by the
state to compose or discharge a prostrate municipality's financial obligations and to settle creditors' claims fairly when all else has failed. Put
simply, can a state, by legislation, allow a city to avoid its debts totally?
On the subject of state bankruptcy legislation, much depends on
whether federal law has preempted the area. 21 8 The municipal bank-

ruptcy chapter of the Federal Bankruptcy Act 1 9 severely limits the
types of conditions which may be imposed on a city's creditors by state
law-the Act expressly prohibits any state law which imposes a composition on non-consenting municipal creditors.220
216. See note 214 supra.
217. One emergency measure a city might employ during a financial crisis is a
reduction in the number or remuneration of municipal employees. In order for the
contract clause to apply, however, an employee must be working under an explicit
contract. Thus, a public officer may have his tenure or salary altered at any time since
the state has exclusive power to control the occupancy and emoluments of public offices.
See Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402 (1851); cf. West River Bridge v.
Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). But see Robertson v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174 (1928)
(a state is liable for services already rendered). Whether a contractual agreement exists
between a state and its employees is determined according to state law. Compare
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (state statute providing for an
indefinite tenure for teachers who had served for at least five years did create a
contract), with Phelps v. Board of Educ., 300 U.S. 319 (1937) (statute prohibiting board
of education from reducing salaries of teachers without cause after three years' service
did not create a contract).
If a contract does exist, the contract clause fully protects an employee's rights. The
contract is subject, however, to a legitimate exercise of state police power. Indiana ex
rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 108-09 (1938); see Subway-Surface Supervisors
Ass'n v. New York City Transit Auth., 85 Misc. 2d 695, 381 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct.
1976) (holding that a wage freeze imposed on Transit Authority employees was
reasonably related and properly directed to alleviation of the New York financial
emergency).
218. The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "to establish . . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. This clause does not deny states the power to enact bankruptcy
or insolvency laws, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 191-97 (1819),
but when the subject matter of state laws in this area is in conflict with federal law, state
law is deemed superseded. Id. at 196; see Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 327 (1931);
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 262-63 (1827).
219. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 401 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
220. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair
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Assuming that the state's action has not been preempted by federal law, the contract clause does not prohibit a state from imposing
an extension or a composition. As might be expected, the contract
clause was not always given such a liberal interpretation. In one of
the earliest contract clause cases, Sturges v. Crowninshield,2 21 the Supreme Court struck down state bankruptcy legislation as applied to pre-

existing contracts.222 After development of the police power doctrine,
however, the Court came to view state bankruptcy legislation with more
tolerance. In Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park22 3 the

Court upheld a statute allowing municipal creditors to force the city
into something resembling an equity receivership with a composition
to be imposed on all creditors after approval by eighty-five percent of
them. 2 4

While recognizing that "a state insolvency act is limited by

the Contract Clause of the Constitution in authorizing composition
of pre-existing debts," the Court determined that whether such an act
is unconstitutional "depends upon what is affected by such a composi-

tion and what state power it brings into play. '22 5 The Court thus employed a contract clause analysis no different from that applied to any
other challenged state law. Since the present Federal Bankruptcy Act
does not preclude states from imposing extension plans on municipal
creditors, 2

state legislatures should be able to impose extensions on

pre-existing municipal creditors so long as the action results in no technical impairment or may be justified as a proper exercise of the police
22 7

power.

the power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any municipality
or any political subdivision of or in such State in the exercise of its political
or governmental powers, including expenditures therefor: Provided, however,
That no State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of
such agencies shall be binding upon any creditor who does not consent to
such composition, and no judgment shall be entered under such State law which
would bind a creditor to such composition without his consent. Id. § 403(i).
221. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
222. Id. at 205-06.
223. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
224, Id. at 504. Court approval of the plan was also required, and several criteria of
fairness which the court was to examine were set forth in the statute. The plan could
not include a reduction of principal and was to be binding on all creditors regardless of
whether they made an appearance. Id. See notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text.
225. 316 U.S. at 513.
226. See Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York, Civil Nos. 6168, 6246 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
1976), slip op. at 25-29. Compositions, by contrast, are precluded. See note 220 supra
and accompanying text.
227. See Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York, Civil Nos. 6168, 6246 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
1976), slip op. at 12-16, where the federal district court for the Southern District of
New York used a standard contract clause/police power analysis in upholding the New
York State Emergency Moratorium Act for the City of New York. See notes 204-10
supra and accompanying text.
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When a municipal corporation is in hopeless financial straits, revoking the municipal charter might appear to be the final opportunity

to free the city from its creditors. States have plenary power, unaffected by the contract clause, to revoke the charter of a municipal corporation and to withdraw its powers entirely. 2 State power over municipal corporations, then, is more extensive than state power over business corporations. 22 9 Nevertheless, all existing contracts of the municipal corporation remain in full force when a municipal charter is revoked.23 0 In addition, when a state has authorized a municipality to

tax for the purpose of meeting its obligations, that taxing power may
not be withdrawn except as a proper exercise of state police power if

city creditors have contracted for the payment of their claims by means
of that resource.23

A municipality's liabilities may be enforced in a number of ways
following revocation of the municipal charter. 32 In several cases,233
a city's charter has been repealed and a new municipal government

established in its place.

The Supreme Court has held that the suc-

cessor city becomes liable for the debts of its predecessor if both cities

encompass substantially the same area, contain substantially the same
taxable property, and are organized for the same general purposes.23 4
228. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (voters and taxpayers
have no contract right to continuation of municipal corporation even though forced
consolidation of their town with a larger municipality would lessen the efficacy of their
vote); Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 511 (1880); 2 E. MCQuiLmN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORAMONS § 9.24, at 692 (3d ed. 1966); Schulz, The Effect of the
Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Upon the Power of the States to
Control Municipal Corporations,36 MicHs. L. REV. 385, 400, 405 (1938).
229. Cf. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
230. Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248, 253 (1906); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289,
305 (1886); Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U.S. 266, 270 (1876); Schulz, supra note 227,
at 400.
231. Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248, 250 (1906); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289,
305 (1886); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 554-55 (1866);
Schulz, supra note 227, at 406; cf. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 520 (1880).
232. Courts can reach only the non-public property of an extinct municipal corporation to satisfy existing debts. Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 390 (1900). From the
municipal creditor's point of view, this remedy is distinctly unsatisfactory. Most city
property is deemed to be impressed with a public trust and therefore exempt from levy
for satisfaction of city debts. See Note, Creditors' Remedies in Municipal Default, 1976
DUKE L.J. 1363, 1369-70.

233. See, e.g., Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Broughton v. Pensacola, 93
U.S. 266 (1876). In Watson the state repealed the charter of the City of Mobile and
subsequently incorporated the Port of Mobile, comprised of substantially the same
taxable property and population but including only about half the area of the former city.
In Broughton the city's charter was surrendered and the citizens established a new
corporate municipal government encompassing substantially the same area, but with
different powers and officers.
234. Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 300 (1886). See generally Schulz, supra note
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When the state abolishes a municipal corporation and does not
create a direct successor but instead divides the geographic area of the
town among several existing municipal corporations, these newly enlarged municipalities become liable for their respective shares of the
If, however, territory is
extinct corporation's unpaid obligations. -"3

detached from one municipal corporation by annexation to another, the
old corporation remains liable for debts incurred before separation 23 6
unless the legislature establishes an equitable plan for apportioning liability between the two. 23 7 The state cannot prevent a city's debts
from following it even by abolishing the municipality and subsuming
it into a county unit governed by state officers who are statutorily forbidden to assess or collect taxes for payment of the defunct city's
bonds.2 3 8
If a municipal corporation is abolished and no political subdivision
is given authority over the area, those who hold the obligations of the
now-extinct municipality apparently have no recourse except to apply

to the state legislature for relief. 2 9 Nevertheless, unless the state is
willing to leave a former municipal corporation with no organized local
government, it appears that the contract clause does not permit a state
to free its cities from debt by abolishing the municipal corporate structure. Of course, some alteration of the carry-over of city obligations
might be reconciled with the police power doctrine. 40
227, at 404. A successor municipal corporation is liable for the debts of its predecessor
even if the predecessor was dissolved because it had been unlawfully organized and even
if the reincorporation act provides that the new municipality will be liable for the debts
of the predecessor only if the voters decide to assume them. Shapleigh v. San Angelo,
167 U.S. 646 (1897).
235. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879); see B. WRIGHT, supra note 3,
at 229.
236. Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875).
237. Morgan v. City of Beloit, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 613 (1868); see Schulz, supra note
227, at 404.
238. Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906).
239. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 501 (1880) (general taxes levied
before repeal of city charter cannot be collected through court of chancery; Court
expresses no opinion on whether different result would obtain in case of taxes levied in
obedience to contract obligations); Barkley v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 93 U.S. 258
(1876) (after municipal corporation abolished without successor, court would not
issue mandamus to compel assessment and collection of taxes under repealed tax law
requiring a tax for payment of liabilities for construction of levees; petitioner was owed
money for work and labor done on levees); B. WRIrrr, supra note 3, at 229; Schulz,
supra note 227, at 405.
240. The cases discussing the consequences of repeal of a corporate charter are from
an era before the police power doctrine was fully developed in the contract clause area.
Hence a police power analysis must be engrafted onto their rationale to bring them up to
date.
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CONCLUSION

It is clear that states can now reach a constitutionally acceptable
avoidance of municipalities' literal debt obligations in a number of situations. Not every legislative alteration of contractual terms or of the
statutory measures necessary to enforce those obligations will be considered an impairment. Only such legislation as actually diminishes the
practical value of the original contract will be labeled an impairment
within the meaning of the contract clause. Moreover, even though a
contract may be technically impaired by state legislation, the contract clause does not void the statute if (1) the legislation bears a reasonable relationship to ends which are within the realm of protection
under the state's police power, and (2) the legislation reflects a spirit
of moderation which at least preserves the quality of the affected
party's contract as an acceptable investment and strikes a balance between the state's purposes and the affected party's interest so that the
alteration of contract appears reasonably necessary to the state's goals.
This construction of the contract clause is certainly open to criticism. Recently the financial community has applauded the decision of
the New York Court of Appeals which invalidated on state constitu241
tional grounds the moratorium on payment of New York City notes.
The lower courts had held that the moratorium was valid under the
contract clause, however, and the Court of Appeals did not discuss or
disturb that ruling. 24 2 The decision triggered the issuance of indebtedness by smaller cities in New York state which had been unable to float
bonds since New York City's 1975 crisis.248
Criticism of a contract clause interpretation which places a premium on state flexibility with respect to the alteration of an obligor's
contract rights is not new.24 4 As early as 1788, James Madison insisted
that
laws impairing the obligation of contracts are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.
. . . The sober people of America ... have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every
subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the
241. See Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1976, at 38, col. 1.
242. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d
848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
243. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
244. Warnings of the danger of allowing states the leeway to interfere with contractual relationships are found in the dissents of Justice Black in City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965), and Justice Sutherland in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934).
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preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform
is wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire
a general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the busi2 45
ness of society.

One may doubt whether the protection rendered by the contract clause
today satisfies this concern with the value of an individual's contract

rights and the ensuing dangers for commercial activity should such

rights be ignored.
245. THE FEDEIRALIST No. 44, at 128-29 (G.P. Putnam's Sons ed. 1889) (J. Madison).

